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STATINTL

WHY 'EVALUATIONS' GO WRONG

CIA's Top Problem:
Built-In Booby Traps

The super-secret Central Intelligence agency which flourishes in cloak and dagger maneuvering in far off lands finds itself in the unaccustomed and undesired glare of public attention because of the recent Cuban fiasco. Chicago's American today presents the second of three articles which intimately detail what the CIA is, and how much it spends on world intrigue.

*BY WARREN ZIMMERMANN

CHICAGO'S AMERICAN Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—Russian Propagandist, Ilya Ehrenburg once said this about Allen W. Dulles, the Presbyterian minister's son who heads the Central Intelligence agency:

"If the spy Allen Dulles should arrive in heaven through somebody's absentmindedness, he would begin to blow up the clouds, mine the stars, and slaughter the angels."

Whatever else this statement may imply, it is a pretty fair compliment to Dulles' cosmic importance.

There are many reasons for Dulles' importance. The Central Intelligence agency is the chief source of intelligence in the United States government. As such it is the right arm of the national security council, the high level cabinet committee dealing with the most crucial problems of defense and foreign policy. The information the CIA collects is prepared only for the eyes of the President and other NSC members.

Dulles himself sits on the NSC; he also is chairman of the intelligence advisory committee, which coordinates the intelligence activities of the other departments—the state department, the departments of the army, navy, and air force, the joint staff, the FBI, and the Atomic Energy commission—and prepares the national intelligence estimates.

These estimates are the last word in government intelligence; they are the raw materials from which top level decisions are made.

The national estimates are designed to answer such questions as: "What is the morale strength of the Soviet Union?" or "What is the probability of revolt in Iran?" or "What would be the chances of an invasion of Cuba?"

Hard Questions

These questions are not always adequately answered by the estimates. The failure of the recent invasion of Cuba by United States backed Cuban rebels has been attributed largely to the CIA's failure to realize that Fidel Castro still retained the support of most of the Cuban people.

The pertinent question about the estimates—one which may help to explain the Cuban failure—is: What does the CIA have to go on in preparing its intelligence reports?

20% Secrecy

By Allen Dulles's own guess, only 20 per cent of the CIA's sources are secret. Four-fifths of the sources are open and above ground, and are as available to the state department as they are to the CIA. It is natural to ask why state's intelligence budget is less than 5 per cent of the CIA's, when state has far more persons stationed abroad.

This is a good question, and intelligent critics are beginning to realize the need for an increase in the state department's intelligence budget. But it should be



ILYA EHRENBURG

compliment for Dulles.

He noted that the CIA has some built-in advantages.

As official representatives of the United States government abroad, foreign service officers are hampered in their range of contacts, which must of necessity concentrate on members of the government in power. The agency has no such restriction; its members can masquerade as business men or tourists and can hobnob with any one who might prove useful to them. Nor does the CIA man have to limit himself to respectable people. He can, and often does, work thru crooks, homosexuals, fellow travelers—individuals a foreign service officer would be fired for associating with.

Free Wheelers

Then, of course, there is the clandestine 20 per cent of the agency's information gathering activities. CIA men are offered a far greater variety of tools—if that is the word—than are foreign service representatives. They can bribe and they can blackmail, and they have the funds at

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